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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (“NGA”), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 717–717z, allows natural gas companies to acquire private 
property by eminent domain to construct, operate, and 
maintain natural gas pipelines.  Id. § 717f(h).  Here, Tennessee 
Gas Pipeline Company, LLC (“Tennessee Gas”) commenced a 
condemnation action under the NGA to acquire easements on 
property owned by King Arthur Estates, LP (“King Arthur”).  
On interlocutory appeal, this case now presents us with a single 
legal issue: whether state law or federal law governs the 
substantive determination of just compensation in 
condemnation actions brought by private entities under the 
NGA.  Because federal law does not supply a rule of decision 
on this precise issue, we must fill the void with a common law 
remedy.  In doing so, we opt to incorporate state law as the 
federal standard.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order reaching the opposite result. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 As required by the NGA, Tennessee Gas holds a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
authorizing it, inter alia, to construct natural gas pipelines in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania to augment its natural gas 
delivery capacity in the region.  As part of this project, 
Tennessee Gas seeks to obtain easements over a 975-acre tract 
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of land in Pike County, Pennsylvania owned by King Arthur.  
Upon unsuccessfully attempting to purchase the requisite 
easements from King Arthur, Tennessee Gas filed the instant 
condemnation action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
71.1 (“Rule 71.1”).     
 After the parties stipulated that Tennessee Gas could 
access and possess the easements, they engaged in discovery 
pertinent to determining the appropriate compensation for the 
condemnation.  Both parties retained various experts to 
appraise, inter alia, the value of the land before and after the 
taking, the value of the timber removed from the land, 
professional fees, development costs, and timber replacement 
and reforestation costs.  Following the close of this discovery, 
Tennessee Gas moved for summary judgment on various 
issues, including that of compensation.   
 As to the issue of compensation, the District Court 
granted in part Tennessee Gas’ motion.  Relying entirely on a 
prior opinion deciding the same issue,1 the District Court ruled 
that federal law governs the substantive determination of just 
compensation in this dispute.  The District Court hence 
                                              
 1 That case also concerned a condemnation action 
brought by Tennessee Gas under the NGA.  Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 1.7320 Acres and 
Temporary Easements for 5.4130 Acres in Shohola Twp., Pike 
Cty., Pa., No. 11-028, 2014 WL 690700, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
24, 2014).  There, the District Court noted the lack of binding 
authority on the substantive determination of compensation, 
discussed persuasive case law on the issue, reviewed the 
parties’ extended arguments on both sides, and, upon doing so, 
determined that federal law applies.  Id. at *6–10.  
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determined that, although King Arthur could recover 
consequential damages for professional fees and development 
costs under Pennsylvania law, it could not do so under federal 
law.  Together, the consequential damages at issue total just 
under $1 million.   
 A few weeks later, King Arthur filed a motion to certify 
the District Court’s order for interlocutory appeal, which the 
District Court granted.  Another Panel of our Court then 
granted King Arthur’s petition for interlocutory appeal.  We 
are now faced with the purely legal question of whether state 
law or federal law governs the substantive determination of just 
compensation in condemnation actions brought by private 
entities under the NGA.     
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and review the legal 
issue presented in this appeal de novo.  Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 
344, 354 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted).   
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Relevant Law 
 Before we delve into the merits of the instant issue, we 
pause to consider the legal landscape in which this dispute 
arises.  In particular, we discuss the background legal 
principles relevant to (1) the NGA, (2) just compensation, 
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(3) federal common lawmaking, and (4) persuasive case law 
on this subject.     
1. The NGA 
 It is well-established that the federal government wields 
the authority to exercise eminent domain.  See Kohl v. United 
States, 91 U.S. 367, 370 (1875) (“The right of eminent domain 
is an ‘inseparable incident of sovereignty.’” (citations 
omitted)).  But that is not all.  Rather, because “the power of 
eminent domain is merely the means to the end,” the federal 
government also has the authority to delegate its eminent 
domain power to private entities.  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26, 33 (1954).  Indeed, Congress has done so in a number of 
legislative settings, including the District of Columbia 
Redevelopment Act of 1945, D.C. Code §§ 5-701 to -737; the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w; and, of 
course, the NGA.     
 In 1938, Congress enacted the NGA based on its 
recognition that “the business of transporting and selling 
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected 
with a public interest.”  15 U.S.C. § 717(a).  Acknowledging 
that “[f]ederal regulation in matters relating to the 
transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate 
and foreign commerce is necessary in the public interest,” 
Congress ensured that the NGA delegated regulatory authority 
to an appropriate body.  Id.  Decades later, this body became 
FERC.  42 U.S.C. § 7171. 
 As relevant here, the NGA allows gas companies to 
acquire private property by eminent domain to construct, 
operate, and maintain natural gas pipelines.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 717f(h).  To do so, however, a natural gas company must first 
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successfully obtain a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity from FERC and unsuccessfully attempt to purchase 
the required property from its owner.  Id.  More fully, the NGA 
provides: 
When any holder of a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity cannot acquire by 
contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of 
property to the compensation to be paid for, the 
necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and 
maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the 
transportation of natural gas, and the necessary 
land or other property, in addition to right-of-
way, for the location of compressor stations, 
pressure apparatus, or other stations or 
equipment necessary to the proper operation of 
such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire the 
same by the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain in the district court of the United States 
for the district in which such property may be 
located, or in the State courts.  The practice and 
procedure in any action or proceeding for that 
purpose in the district court of the United States 
shall conform as nearly as may be with the 
practice and procedure in similar action or 
proceeding in the courts of the State where the 
property is situated: Provided, That the United 
States district courts shall only have jurisdiction 
of cases when the amount claimed by the owner 
of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original).      
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 The statute’s reference to state “practice and 
procedure,” however, does not mean that it incorporates state 
law for the substantive determination of compensation.  Id.  
Although some courts have concluded otherwise, see, e.g., 
Miss. River Transmission Corp. v. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662, 665 
n.3 (5th Cir. 1985), “this language require[s] conformity in 
procedural matters only.”  United States v. 93.970 Acres of 
Land, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959) (citations omitted).  In any 
event, that language has been superseded by Rule 71.1, which 
establishes its own procedures applicable to all condemnation 
cases in federal court.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1, Advisory 
Committee Notes (1951) (explaining that the new rule “affords 
a uniform procedure for all cases of condemnation invoking 
the national power of eminent domain, and . . . supplants all 
statutes prescribing a different procedure”); see also Alliance 
Pipeline LP v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 
2014) (collecting cases).   
 As a result, the NGA is silent regarding the applicability 
of state law in condemnation proceedings under the statute.  
Indeed, the NGA is generally silent on the remedies available 
in the condemnation proceedings it allows.  For example, it 
does not even expressly require that just compensation be 
provided.   
2. Just Compensation 
 That concept of just compensation originates from the 
Fifth Amendment: although the federal government has “the 
authority to take private property for public use by eminent 
domain . . . [it] is obliged by the Fifth Amendment to provide 
‘just compensation’ to the owner” of the property.  Kirby 
Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1984) (citing 
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371).  Under the Fifth Amendment, just 
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compensation generally means “the fair market value of the 
property on the date it is appropriated” and nothing more.  Id. 
at 10; see also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374–76 
(1943).  In other words, in such contexts, “the Constitution has 
never been construed as requiring payment of consequential 
damages” like lost profits or development costs.  Miller, 317 
U.S. at 376.  This is because “the sovereign need only pay for 
what it actually takes rather than for all that the owner has lost.”  
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1215 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Klein v. United States, 375 F.2d 825, 
829 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).   
 Thus, in cases involving partial takings, as here, the 
standard is “the difference between the market value of the 
entire holding immediately before the taking and the remaining 
market value immediately thereafter of the portion of property 
rights not taken.”  United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 918 
F.2d 389, 393 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).  “If the value of the remaining 
land, on a unit basis, diminishes when the condemned parcel is 
removed from the larger whole, the landowner is entitled to 
compensation ‘both for that which is physically appropriated 
and for the diminution in value to the non-condemned 
property.’”  United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 
1139 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. 33.5 Acres of 
Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Miller, 
317 U.S. at 376 (“If only a portion of a single tract is taken[,] 
the owner’s compensation for that taking includes any element 
of value arising out of the relation of the part taken to the entire 
tract.”).  But, if the taking somehow benefits the value of the 
remaining land, “the benefit may be set off against the value of 
the land taken.”  Miller, 317 U.S. at 376.   
 By contrast, Pennsylvania has enacted its own remedial 
scheme that is applicable to condemnation proceedings that 
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take place within the state.  Similar to federal law, 
Pennsylvania law defines just compensation as consisting of 
“the difference between the fair market value of the 
condemnee’s entire property interest immediately before the 
condemnation and as unaffected by the condemnation and the 
fair market value of the property interest remaining 
immediately after the condemnation and as affected by the 
condemnation.”  26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 702(a).   
 But fair market value appears to be a more inclusive 
concept under Pennsylvania law.  In contrast to the federal rule 
regarding partial takings, the recoverable market value under 
Pennsylvania law appears to include any benefits to the value 
of the remaining property as a result of the taking.  See id. 
§ 706(a).   
 Further, although Pennsylvania law generally defines 
fair market value as “the price which would be agreed to by a 
willing and informed seller and buyer,” it allows consideration 
of certain consequential damages within the concept.  Id. § 703.  
For example, the relevant law provides that one of the factors 
for determining fair market value is the “cost of adjustments 
and alterations to any remaining property made necessary or 
reasonably required by the condemnation.”  Id. § 1105(2)(v); 
see also id. § 703(4) (stating that considerations for fair market 
value include factors regarding what evidence may be 
proffered pursuant to §§ 1101–06).  
 Pennsylvania law also permits recovery of professional 
fees such as appraisal, attorney, and engineering fees.  Id. 
§ 710.  The default rule limits such recovery to $4,000.  Id. 
§ 710(a).  But a property owner is entitled to complete 
reimbursement for those professional fees when the 
“condemnor attempts to avoid the payment of monetary just 
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compensation to which the [owner] otherwise would be 
entitled by use of a substitute for monetary compensation and 
the [owner] incurs expenses” as a result.  Id. § 716.  On the 
whole, then, Pennsylvania law allows private property owners 
within the state to obtain more money from condemnors than 
they could under federal law.    
3. Federal Common Law 
 “Federal common law refers to the development of 
legally binding federal rules articulated by a federal court 
which cannot be easily found on the face of a constitutional or 
statutory provision.”  McGurl v. Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey 
Welfare Fund, Inc., 124 F.3d 471, 480 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations 
omitted).  The need for common lawmaking “stems from the 
inability of legislators to anticipate every possible contingency 
and the impracticability of judges[’] returning all unanswered 
questions to the legislature.”  Id. at 481 (citation omitted).  
Justice Jackson once explained that federal common law 
“implements the federal Constitution and statutes[] and is 
conditioned by them.  Within these limits, federal courts are 
free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision 
and to draw upon all the sources of the common law.”  
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 343, 350 (1939)).    
 Thus, “when Congress has not spoken ‘in an area 
comprising issues substantially related to an established 
program of government operation,’” United States v. Kimbell 
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (quoting United States 
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)), the 
Supreme Court has “direct[ed] federal courts to fill the 
interstices of federal legislation ‘according to their own 
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standards,’” id. (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).   
 In crafting such federal common law, however, courts 
need not “inevitably . . . resort to uniform federal rules.”  Id. at 
727–28 (citations omitted).  Instead, “[w]hether to adopt state 
law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of 
judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations 
always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental 
interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.’”  
Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 
301, 310 (1947)).   
 In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court addressed the 
propriety of applying state law under an ambiguous or 
incomplete federal statute.  Id. at 718, 723.  There, the issue 
was whether, lacking an express statutory directive, a certain 
federal loans program needed a uniform federal rule of lien 
priorities.  Id. at 718.  The Supreme Court answered this 
question in the negative, holding that state law governed the 
priority of the liens.  Id. at 740.  In incorporating state law as 
the federal rule, the Supreme Court employed a three-factor 
test, considering (1) whether the federal program, by its very 
nature, required uniformity; (2) whether application of state 
law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; 
and (3) whether application of uniform federal law would 
disrupt existing commercial relationships predicated on state 
law.  Id. at 728–29. 
 In light of Kimbell Foods and its progeny, where federal 
law governs a controversy but there is no federal rule of 
decision on a particular matter, a federal court must fill the void 
through common lawmaking, either by fashioning a uniform, 
national rule or by incorporating state law as the federal 
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standard.  Deciding which route to take turns on application of 
the Kimbell Foods factors outlined above.     
4. Persuasive Case Law 
 The precise issue before us now is whether state law or 
federal law governs the measure of just compensation in 
condemnation proceedings brought by a private entity under 
the NGA.  Although this is the first time we have considered 
this issue precedentially,2 ample other courts have opined on 
it.  Despite an array of district court decisions on the matter, 
we focus our attention on seminal opinions from two of our 
sister circuits: the Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.  
 In Georgia Power Company v. Sanders, the Fifth 
Circuit, sitting en banc, encountered the same core issue, albeit 
in an analogous FPA context.  617 F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 
1980).  The FPA, employing language substantially similar to 
that in the NGA, allows private entities to use eminent domain 
to condemn private property in efforts to develop waterways.  
                                              
 2 Another Panel of our Court recently remarked on this 
issue in a footnote of an unpublished opinion.  See Columbia 
Gas Transmission, LLC v. Easement in Washington Cty., 745 
F. App’x 446, 449 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Federal law governs the 
measure of just compensation owed to landowners in 
condemnation actions under the [NGA].” (citing United States 
v. Certain Parcels of Land in Phila., 144 F.2d 626, 628–30 (3d 
Cir. 1944)).  We are not bound by our unpublished decisions 
and neither party here has cited the case.  In any event, the 
statement was not necessary to the Court’s decision affirming 
the exclusion of “speculative” expert testimony regarding the 
“future profitability” of a condemned property.  Id. at 450. 
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Id. at 1114 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 797(e)).  But, like the NGA, 
it does not prescribe a rule of decision as to the appropriate 
compensation owed to condemnees.  Id. at 1115.     
 Accordingly, the Georgia Power court undertook the 
federal common lawmaking analysis described above.  As a 
threshold matter, because the condemnation at issue arose 
under the FPA, a federal statute, the court determined that the 
measure of compensation should also derive from a federal 
source.  Id.  Given the statutory gap, the court then turned to 
Kimbell Foods to decide whether to fashion a uniform common 
law or incorporate state law as the applicable federal rule.  Id. 
(citations omitted).   
 At the outset, the court noted that “[b]asic 
considerations of federalism,” id., create a “presumption 
favoring adoption of state law as the federal rule,” id. at 1116 
n.6, “unless it is shown that legislative intent or other sufficient 
reasons exist to displace state law,” id. at 1118.  But the court 
found neither.  Id.  Hence, upon determining that the balance 
of Kimbell Foods factors weighed in favor of incorporating 
state law, the court concluded that “the law of the state where 
the condemned property is located is to be adopted as the 
appropriate federal rule for determining the measure of 
compensation when a licensee exercises the power of eminent 
domain” under the FPA.  Id. at 1124.   
 The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation v. Exclusive Natural 
Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1199 (6th Cir. 1992).  
There, as here, a natural gas company sought to condemn 
private property under the NGA, giving rise to the issue of 
whether state law somehow applies in measuring the 
appropriate compensation.  Id. at 1193–94.  As to the threshold 
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inquiry, the court concluded with “no hesitation” that, since the 
NGA is a federal statute, its interpretation is a matter of federal 
law.  Id. at 1196.  Thus, given the NGA’s void in prescribing 
the appropriate compensation, the court turned to Kimbell 
Foods.  Id.  In applying its factors, the court determined that 
(1) it is unnecessary to fashion a nationally uniform rule of 
compensation for private parties condemning land under the 
NGA, (2) incorporating state law as the federal standard would 
not frustrate the specific objectives of the NGA, and 
(3) property rights have traditionally been defined by state law.  
Id. at 1198–99.  Therefore, the court adopted state law as the 
federal standard to govern compensation determinations under 
the NGA.  Id. at 1199.   
B. Application 
 Having established the basic legal principles relevant to 
this dispute, we turn to applying them to the specific facts of 
this case.  As an initial matter, we declare without hesitation 
that defining the contours of the compensation owed here is an 
issue of federal law.  Indeed, the NGA is a federal statute 
implementing a nationwide federal program.  Id. at 1196.  As 
a result, its interpretation is naturally a matter of federal law.   
1. Kimbell Foods Applies Here 
 Given that conclusion, in order to resort to the Kimbell 
Foods analysis, we must also determine that there exists a gap 
in the statutory scheme.  Here, we do so because (i) Miller does 
not resolve this case, (ii) the NGA does not answer the question 
at issue, and (iii) the existence of related common law in this 
domain is of no moment.  We explain each in turn.   
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i. Miller Does Not Resolve This Case 
 Tennessee Gas’ chief argument on appeal is that Miller 
dispositively resolves this case.  In ruling in Tennessee Gas’ 
favor at summary judgment, the District Court agreed.  We, 
however, disagree.  
 In Miller, the Supreme Court considered “questions 
respecting standards for valuing property taken for public use” 
in relation to the federal government’s condemnation of land 
for the purpose of building railroad tracks.  317 U.S. at 370.  
Noting that the “measure of compensation” is a “question[] of 
substantive right . . . grounded upon the Constitution,” the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that state substantive law 
should apply to the determination of compensation in that 
dispute because the federal statutes at issue there only required 
adoption of state procedural law.  Id. at 379–80 (citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court thus held, as relevant here, that 
federal law—not state law—governs the determination of 
compensation in eminent domain actions brought by the 
federal government.  Id. at 380 (citations omitted).   
 Over time, Miller and its progeny have added content to 
the federal common law of just compensation.  See, e.g., id. at 
373 (explaining that the condemnee is to be “put in as good 
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property 
had not been taken” (citations omitted)); id. at 373–74 
(defining just compensation to mean the fair market value of 
the property on the date of the taking); id. at 375 (excluding the 
condemned property’s “special value to the condemnor” from 
the measure of just compensation (citations omitted)); id. at 
376 (including “severance damage” in the measure of just 
compensation but excluding “consequential damages” such as 
the change in value of “separate tracts adjoining that affected 
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by the taking” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. 
Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979) (per curiam) (excluding 
appraisal and attorneys’ fees); United States v. Petty Motor 
Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946) (excluding “loss of profits, 
damage to good will, the expense of relocation and other such 
consequential losses” from the measure of just compensation 
(citations omitted)). 
 But nothing in Miller or its progeny expands its reach to 
condemnations by private entities.  Indeed, Miller itself only 
concerned a condemnation by the federal government.  317 
U.S. at 370.  We have explicitly recognized this limitation, 
previously noting that Miller announced the standard for 
determining only “the amount of compensation due an owner 
of land condemned by the United States.”  Certain Parcels of 
Land in Phila., 144 F.2d at 629 (emphasis added).  Other courts 
have similarly constrained Miller to “condemnation 
proceedings brought by the federal government.”  33.5 Acres 
of Land, 789 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added); see Ga. Power, 
617 F.2d at 1119 & n.10 (“[W]e do not deem [Miller] 
controlling[.]”). 
 Further, Tennessee Gas is unable to muster any binding 
authority for the proposition that Miller applies beyond 
instances where the federal government is the condemnor.  
Although it contends that we have “applied federal law in every 
case involving the determination of compensation in a 
condemnation pursuant to the federal power of eminent 
domain,” it can only cite cases in which the condemnor was the 
federal government.  Appellee’s Br. 16 (emphasis omitted) 
(citing, inter alia, United States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, 924 
F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 412.93 Acres of Land, 
455 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1972); and United States v. 60.14 Acres 
of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 662, 665 (3d Cir. 1966)).  This is also 
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true for the cases from our sister circuits that it cites, allegedly 
for the broad proposition that these other courts “similarly 
follow[] Miller for federal condemnations.”  Id. at 17–18 
(citing U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land, 
821 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 2,560.00 Acres 
of Land, More or Less, 836 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1988); 33.5 
Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396; United States v. 320.0 Acres of 
Land, More or Less, 605 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Certain Prop. Located in Borough of Manhattan, 344 
F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Interests in 
Prop. in Champaign Cty., 271 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1959); and 
United States v. Mahowald, 209 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1954)).  
But, again, none of these cases relying on Miller involved a 
private entity as the condemnor.         
 That is because no such binding case exists.  This makes 
sense, of course, because the powerful federal interest at play 
when the federal government is the condemnor is considerably 
weakened when a private entity is the condemnor.  Two 
independent reasons support our view on this matter.   
 First, the development of natural gas pipelines is not an 
“essential governmental function[].”  93.970 Acres of Land, 
360 U.S. at 332 (citation omitted).  Long ago, in a 
condemnation action brought by the federal government to 
create a post office, the Supreme Court noted that it is 
“essential” to the federal government’s “independent existence 
and perpetuity” that it be able to “perform its proper functions.”  
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 368, 371.  Nearly a century later, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that concern, this time ruling that, because the 
federal government’s condemnation of land for naval aviation 
activities involved “essential governmental functions,” federal 
law, not state law, determined the appropriate remedies for the 
condemnation.  93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. at 332–33 
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(citing Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371).  Here, by contrast, developing 
natural gas pipelines is not a function—much less an essential 
function—of the federal government.  Accordingly, the federal 
interest at play here is materially less than if the federal 
government were pursuing condemnation for an important 
governmental function.         
 Second, where the federal government is the 
condemnor, there exists a significant concern about the 
spending of federal dollars, one that does not exist when a 
private entity is the condemnor.  Indeed, the federal 
government has a strong interest in reducing the costs of its 
own exercises of eminent domain and being subject to different 
states’ compensation regimes may defeat that.  Cf. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (considering the impact of 
available relief, albeit in the sovereign immunity context, on 
government treasuries).  However, that concern is not at all in 
play where, as here, the condemnor is a private entity pursuing 
the condemnation “for purposes of profit.”  Pub. Util. Dist. No. 
1 of Pend Oreille Cty. v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d 666, 670 (9th 
Cir. 1967).  Because of these two distinct reasons, Miller is 
distinguishable and therefore does not resolve this case.3   
                                              
 3 That said, we recognize that Miller articulates 
principles for compensation “grounded upon the Constitution.”  
317 U.S. at 380.  Those principles are thus more properly 
understood as a constitutional baseline upon which states may 
allow for more, but not less, compensation for condemnees.  
Such additional protections by states arise in an array of legal 
contexts.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) 
(holding that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional); 
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ii. The NGA Does Not Answer the Question 
 Miller aside, the NGA also does not provide a federal 
rule of decision as to the appropriate compensation owed to 
condemnees under the statute.  As mentioned previously, the 
NGA does provide that the “practice and procedure” in 
condemnation actions under the statute must “conform as 
nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar 
action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the 
property is situated.”  15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).  Some courts have 
concluded that this statutory directive mandates that state law 
govern the measure of just compensation.  See, e.g., Tabor, 757 
F.2d at 665 n.3.  Other courts have read this clause as “raising 
a strong presumption that state law does provide the proper 
measure for such determination.”  Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 
1197.  For two reasons, however, this clause is inapplicable 
here, rendering the NGA silent on the issue of compensation.   
 First, the clause has been superseded by Rule 71.1, 
which now “govern[s] proceedings to condemn real and 
personal property by eminent domain.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(a).  
As a “law[] in conflict with” a rule of civil procedure, the 
clause has “no further force or effect.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  
“As several other courts have observed,” then, “Rule 71.1 
displaces state procedural law in this condemnation 
proceeding.”  Alliance Pipeline, 746 F.3d at 367 (collecting 
cases); see also S. Nat. Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman Cty., 197 
F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999).  Several decades ago, the 
Supreme Court itself determined that analogous language in 
another federal statute was “clearly repealed” by a precursor to 
                                              
see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3b (indicating that New Jersey 
banned the death penalty in 2007).   
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Rule 71.1.  93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. at 333 n.7 (1959) 
(citing 50 U.S.C. § 171). 
 
 Second, even if the clause was still in force, it would 
determine only procedural rules and nothing more.  Faced with 
a similar statutory instruction to try condemnation cases 
according to “the forms and methods of procedure” provided 
by state law, Miller held that the federal substantive measure 
of just compensation was unchanged.  317 U.S. at 380 (citing 
40 U.S.C. § 258 (1940)).  For good reason, then, the First 
Circuit has expressed “surpris[e]” that “several circuits have 
read the phrase ‘practice and procedure’ to encompass state 
substantive law as well as formal practice.”  Portland Nat. Gas 
Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres of Land, 318 F.3d 279, 282 n.1 
(1st Cir. 2003).  Even the Sixth Circuit, which ultimately 
applied state law to determine just compensation under the 
NGA, expressed that the effect of the clause on the substantive 
measure of just compensation was “arguably open to 
question.”  Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1197.  Accordingly, the 
NGA does not speak to the appropriate measure of 
compensation in proceedings under the statute. 
   
iii. That There Exists a Body of Related  
Common Law Does Not Matter 
 Tennessee Gas asserts as a secondary argument that 
Kimbell Foods applies only when no federal common law 
exists.  But we have previously applied the Kimbell Foods 
framework to choose between incorporating state law and 
applying preexisting federal common law.  See In re Columbia 
Gas Sys. Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]his 
court already has developed federal common law concerning 
trusts.”).  Consistent with this approach, the Georgia Power 
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court applied Kimbell Foods to decide between state rules of 
just compensation and the “established body of federal law on 
the issue.”  617 F.2d at 1123 n.17; cf. Cal. ex rel. State Lands 
Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283–84 (1982) (noting 
that federal common law of land accretion already existed in 
the course of deciding that federal common law, rather than 
state law, would supply a rule of decision).  The Kimbell Foods 
framework is thus not reserved for situations in which federal 
common law has yet to be fashioned.  As a result, we now turn 
to Kimbell Foods to resolve this case. 
 
2. State Law Should Be Incorporated as the Federal Standard 
 Because the source of eminent domain power at issue 
here is federal, as embodied in the NGA, but neither the statute 
nor binding precedent specifies a rule of decision in this 
particular context, the task of “interstitial federal lawmaking” 
falls upon us.  Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1115 (citing Little Lake 
Misere Land, 412 U.S. at 593).  We must now determine 
whether, in developing a federal standard for just 
compensation in condemnation proceedings brought by private 
entities under the NGA, we should fashion a uniform federal 
rule or instead incorporate state law as the applicable federal 
rule.   
 We start with the presumption that state law should be 
incorporated unless there is an expression of legislative intent 
to the contrary or a showing that state law significantly 
conflicts with the federal interest present.  See Kimbell Foods, 
440 U.S. at 739 (“Thus, the prudent course is to adopt the 
ready[-]made body of state law as the federal rule of decision 
until Congress strikes a different accommodation.” (citations 
omitted)); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 
(1991) (“The presumption that state law should be 
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incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong in 
areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships 
with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be 
governed by state-law standards.” (citing, inter alia, Kimbell 
Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–29, 39–40)).  Here, as explained below, 
there is neither.  We thus presume that state law should be 
incorporated in this case.      
 But, even without such a starting presumption, we 
choose to incorporate state law as the federal rule in this 
context because the balance of Kimbell Foods factors weighs 
in favor of that.  In particular, (i) fashioning a nationally 
uniform rule is unnecessary, (ii) incorporating state law does 
not frustrate the NGA’s objectives, and (iii) application of a 
uniform federal rule would upset commercial relationships.  
We address each factor in turn.  
i. Fashioning a Nationally Uniform Rule is Unnecessary 
 For five principal reasons, this case does not require a 
nationally uniform rule.  First, the United States is not a party 
here—or in NGA condemnation proceedings generally—so 
the federal interest in a nationally uniform rule is relatively 
weak.  The Fifth Circuit, for example, has noted that “the 
nature of the federal interests involved [where a private entity 
is the condemnor] differs markedly from the nature of the 
federal interests involved where the United States is the 
condemnor.”  Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1119–20.  So has the 
Ninth Circuit, recognizing that “[b]y issuance of a license the 
United States is not acting in the national interest through the 
licensee to the same extent as it would if it undertook the 
project itself.”  City of Seattle, 382 F.2d at 669. 
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 The Supreme Court has also suggested that whether the 
federal government is present in a case is important in deciding 
between state law and federal law.  See Kimbell Foods, 440 
U.S. at 726 (“This Court has consistently held that federal law 
governs questions involving the rights of the United States 
arising under nationwide federal programs.” (emphasis 
added)).  More specifically, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between, on the one hand, cases involving the 
federal government that “generate immediate interests” and 
therefore warrant federal law and, on the other hand, cases 
“purely between private parties” that “do[] not touch the rights 
and duties of the United States” and are thus “far too 
speculative, far too remote . . . to justify the application of 
federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.”  Bank 
of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33–34 
(1956); see also Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1117 (citing Parnell 
for the proposition that federal interests are weaker in 
condemnation actions to which the federal government is not a 
party). 
 
 Second, because property rights are traditionally an area 
of state concern, the federal interest in a nationally uniform rule 
for property valuation is especially weak.  See id. at 1123.  A 
court fashioning a uniform rule of just compensation would not 
be writing on a blank slate: “far from offering an analytically 
distinct and self-contained analysis,” such a rule “would at best 
merely superimpose a layer of property right allocation onto 
the already well-developed state property regime.”  Columbia 
Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198.  Instead of achieving nationwide 
uniformity, introducing a federal standard for compensation 
here risks muddying elaborate state property rules. 
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 Third, the NGA contemplates state participation in 
multiple ways, further undermining the case for a nationally 
uniform rule of compensation in such actions.  Most notably, 
the statute allows licensees to bring condemnation proceedings 
in state court.  15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (articulating that private 
entities may bring condemnation proceedings “in the district 
court of the United States for the district in which such property 
may be located, or in the State courts” (emphasis added)).  
Indeed, the NGA requires that the proceedings take place in 
state court if the amount claimed by the property owner does 
not exceed $3,000.  See id.  Both the statutory option and 
mandate to proceed in state court suggest that incorporating 
state law would not upset any important interest in national 
uniformity. 
 
 But that is not the extent of the NGA’s involving states.  
As another example, the NGA explicitly exempts from its 
coverage any entities or facilities that receive natural gas for 
distribution “within or at the boundary of a State if all the 
natural gas so received is ultimately consumed within such 
State, . . . provided that the rates and service of such [entities] 
and facilities [are] subject to regulation by a State 
commission.”  Id. § 717(c).  Moreover, the NGA does not 
prohibit states from regulating natural gas companies involved 
in interstate activities covered by the statute.  We recently held 
that the “NGA leaves untouched the [states’] internal 
[environmental] administrative review process[es]” applicable 
to natural gas facilities, “which may continue to operate as 
[they] would in the ordinary course under state law,” even 
though the facilities at issue might be part of a larger interstate 
project.  Twp. of Bordentown, N.J. v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234, 268 
(3d Cir. 2018); see Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
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15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)).  Collectively, these instances of the 
NGA’s explicitly allowing state involvement militate against 
the need for a nationally uniform rule.  
    
 Fourth, to the extent that some nationwide uniformity is 
needed in NGA condemnation actions, Rule 71.1 provides a 
sufficient amount of that.  Indeed, Rule 71.1 was promulgated 
precisely “to provide a unified and coherent set of rules and 
procedures to be used in deciding federal eminent domain 
actions.”  Land, Cullman Cty., 197 F.3d at 1375.  Further 
uniformity in substantive property valuation is unnecessary 
where there is already uniformity in procedure.  
 
 Fifth, Tennessee Gas’ primary argument in favor of 
uniformity misses the mark.  In particular, Tennessee Gas avers 
that applying various states’ rules on compensation will lead to 
landowners in different states receiving different payouts from 
the same pipeline project.  But how inequitable this may be is 
unfortunately of no moment in this analysis.  The first Kimbell 
Foods factor is not whether a nationally uniform law would be 
fairer.  Rather, it is whether proper “administration of the 
federal program[]” requires uniformity.  See Kimbell Foods, 
440 U.S. at 730.  Here, that is not the case.  As a result, this 
factor weighs in favor of incorporating state law as the federal 
rule of decision.   
 
ii. Incorporating State Law Does Not  
Frustrate the NGA’s Objectives 
 The second Kimbell Foods factor calls for considering 
whether the incorporation of state law would frustrate specific 
objectives of the federal program at issue.  “[C]onsiderations 
of federalism militate in favor of adopting state law as the 
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federal rule of decision” unless “state law conflicts 
significantly with any federal interests or policies.”  Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1266 
(2d Cir. 1987) (citing Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1116); see Wallis 
v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).  Because 
state law would not frustrate the NGA’s goals, this factor 
weighs in favor of incorporating state law as the federal rule of 
decision. 
 
 To begin, we must identify the federal objectives 
potentially at risk.  The NGA declares that the federal interest 
is in regulating “matters relating to the transportation of natural 
gas and the sale thereof.”  15 U.S.C. § 717(a).  Nothing in the 
NGA suggests that Congress was particularly concerned with 
protecting natural gas companies from the additional costs that 
varying state laws may impose, or even with making natural 
gas companies’ transactions streamlined or efficient.  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has articulated that, in enacting the NGA, 
Congress was instead concerned with protecting the interests 
of the public, including consumers and property owners.  See 
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 364 
U.S. 137, 147 (1960) (“[T]he primary aim of the [NGA is] to 
protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural 
gas companies.” (quotations omitted)). 
 
 Here, applying Pennsylvania law on just compensation 
would require Tennessee Gas to pay approximately $1 million 
more than it is required to pay under federal law.  In other 
words, “[t]he only conceivable effect that adopting state law as 
the measure of compensation might have” is that “condemnors 
proceeding under the [NGA] might be required to pay more . . . 
than under an alternative federal common-law rule.”  Columbia 
Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198.  But we have already identified 
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condemnors’ having to pay more than they would otherwise 
pay under federal law as merely being an “ancillary issue.”  In 
re Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d at 1058.   
 
 That said, a state could theoretically have a 
compensation law so far out of step with federal law as to 
create a significant conflict.  At oral argument, counsel for 
Tennessee Gas was only able to muster one case in support of 
that proposition.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 822 F.2d at 1265–
68.  But that case is easily distinguishable from this case. 
 
 In National Railroad Passenger, the Second Circuit 
considered, as relevant here, whether to fashion a uniform 
federal rule or incorporate state law as the rule of decision in 
determining the appropriate compensation due to a property 
owner whose land the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (“Amtrak”) had condemned.  Id. at 1262, 1265–
66.  Applying the Georgia Power analysis, which it deemed 
“sound,” id. at 1266, the court nonetheless reached a different 
result: upon concluding that the application of state law would 
“seriously interfer[e]” with the federal objectives of the 
intercity rail passenger service program, id. at 1266–67, the 
court opted to fashion a uniform federal rule in lieu of 
incorporating state law, id. at 1266.  But the court itself noted 
a major distinction between the two cases that thus counseled 
the different result.  Id. at 1267.  In particular, the court 
explained: 
 
In Georgia Power, moreover, resolving the 
question of compensation according to state law 
resulted solely in higher condemnation costs to 
FPA licensees.  That would not be the case here.  
Under [state] law, a partial taking rendering 
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excess property nonconforming under local 
zoning laws requires the condemnor to apply for 
a variance prior to the taking; failing that, the 
condemnor is to reimburse the owner for the 
entire parcel and take title in fee simple thereto.  
We agree with [Amtrak] that application of the 
state rule of compensation here would place 
Amtrak in the unenviable position of having 
either to enmesh itself in the variance procedures 
of each locality in [the state] where property is 
sought to be condemned, or to pay for entire 
parcels irrespective of the nexus between the 
property so taken and the project necessitating 
condemnation.  Inasmuch as Amtrak is 
authorized only to condemn property required 
for intercity rail passenger service, see 45 U.S.C. 
§ 545(d)(1)(B), the latter alternative under [state] 
law conflicts with an express statutory limit on 
Amtrak’s eminent domain power. 
 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 822 F.2d at 1267. 
 
 Here, those considerations are simply not at play.  Like 
the condemnor in Georgia Power, Tennessee Gas would only 
be subject to higher condemnation costs if subjected to state 
laws on compensation.  Pennsylvania compensation law does 
not entail a complicated variance requirement in which 
Tennessee Gas would have to “enmesh itself.”  Id.  National 
Railroad Passenger is thus inapposite.     
 
 Pressed at length for other examples of “crazy state 
laws,” counsel for Tennessee Gas could not produce any.  Oral 
Arg. Audio 36:03–38:23 (mentioning Sabal Trail 
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Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 16-CV-063, 2017 WL 
2783995 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017), which also only involved 
potentially higher condemnation costs).  In the absence of any 
further, concrete examples of significantly divergent state laws 
that could frustrate the NGA’s purpose of protecting the public 
interest, we are unpersuaded by the theoretical possibility that 
some others may exist.  Consequently, this factor also weighs 
in favor of incorporating state law as the federal rule of 
decision.   
 
iii. Application of a Uniform Federal Rule  
Would Upset Commercial Relationships 
 The third Kimbell Foods factor calls for us to consider 
whether application of a uniform federal rule would upset 
commercial expectations founded on state law.  On the one 
hand, because there already exists “an established body of 
federal law on the issue of just compensation” in general, 
parties that conduct business in this industry are already on 
notice of the potential application of federal law.  Ga. Power, 
617 F.2d at 1123 n.17 (citation omitted).  
 
 On the other hand, “property rights have traditionally 
been, and to a large degree are still, defined in substantial part 
by state law.”  Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198 (citation 
omitted).  Thus, were we to fashion a uniform federal rule, “far 
from offering an analytically distinct and self-contained 
analysis,” the rule would “merely superimpose a layer of 
property right allocation onto the already well-developed state 
property regime.”  Id.  Indeed, “when dealing with those 
powers left to the states, the courts should tread gingerly” in 
attempting to create a uniform common law.  Ga. Power, 617 
F.2d at 1125 (Fay, J., concurring); see Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 
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822 F.2d at 1267 (“[S]ince state law usually governs the 
question of what constitutes property, the value of property 
rights is ordinarily best determined according to state law as 
well.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 
 Though the balance is close, we conclude that 
fashioning a uniform federal common law to determine just 
compensation in condemnation actions by private entities 
under the NGA would risk “upsetting the parties’ commercial 
expectations” based upon “the already well-developed state 
property regime.”  Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198.  Hence, 
this factor also militates in favor of incorporating state law as 
the federal rule of decision.  
 
* * * 
 In sum, we determine that, at the threshold, federal law 
is the interpretive basis to determine just compensation in 
condemnation proceedings arising out of the NGA.  But, 
because neither Miller nor any other binding authority provides 
a federal rule of decision as to what constitutes just 
compensation precisely where a private entity condemns 
private property under the statute, we turn to Kimbell Foods.  
That case and its progeny reflect a presumption in favor of state 
law, one not rebutted here.  Even without that presumption, 
however, the Kimbell Foods factors collectively weigh in favor 
of state law because, for the reasons explained previously, 
(1) fashioning a nationally uniform rule is unnecessary, 
(2) incorporating state law does not frustrate the NGA’s 
objectives, and (3) application of a uniform federal rule would 
upset commercial relationships.  In light of this analysis, we 
decide to incorporate state substantive law as the federal 
standard of measuring just compensation in condemnation 
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proceedings by private entities acting under the authority of the 
NGA.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
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Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent 
Easement for 7.053 Acres, Permanent Overlay Easement for 
1.709 Acres and Temporary Easements for 8.551 Acres 
No. 17-3700 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The United States has delegated its eminent domain 
power under the Fifth Amendment to natural gas companies in 
certain instances pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (the “NGA” 
or the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z.  The Supreme Court in 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), held that federal 
substantive law applies to determine just compensation for an 
exercise of the eminent domain power under the Fifth 
Amendment.  However, Miller featured the Government and 
not a private party exercising the Fifth Amendment eminent 
domain power.  My learned colleagues cogently explain why 
that makes all the difference.  The Supreme Court may well 
agree when it considers this legal issue.  Indeed, other courts’ 
holdings support my colleagues’ position.   
 
In my view, however, resolution of the question here 
presented begins and ends with the Miller decision.  I believe 
that the standard by which we measure just compensation due 
for an exercise of the Fifth Amendment eminent domain power 
is the same regardless of whether it is the Government or a 
Government-delegatee that exercises that power.1  Because I 
                                              
1 Indeed, the only time this Court has passed on the precise 
issue presented here, the panel unanimously held that federal 
substantive law applies — albeit in a non-precedential 
decision.  See Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. An 
Easement to Construct Operate & Maintain a 20 Inch Gas 
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believe that the Supreme Court’s Miller decision controls here 
and that federal substantive law applies to determine just 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, I respectfully 
dissent.   
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
The Fifth Amendment assures that private property 
shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  
U.S. Const. amend. V.  The eminent domain power belongs to 
the federal government, but Congress may “delegate[ it] to 
private corporations, to be exercised by them in the execution 
of works in which the public is interested.”  Boom Co. v. 
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).  As noted by the majority, 
Congress did just that in the NGA.  See E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. 
v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 821 (4th Cir. 2004); S. Nat. Gas Co. v. 
Land, Cullman Cty., 197 F.3d 1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999).   
  
The NGA recognizes that “the business of transporting 
and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is 
affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation in 
matters relating to the transportation of natural gas and the sale 
thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the 
public interest.”  15 U.S.C. § 717(a).  The Act, under certain 
conditions, authorizes a natural gas company to acquire “by the 
exercise of the right of eminent domain” property rights 
                                              
Transmission Pipeline Across Props., 745 F. App’x 446, 449 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Federal law governs the measure of just 
compensation owed to landowners in condemnation actions 
under the Natural Gas Act.”). 
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necessary “to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line . . . 
for the transportation of natural gas.”  Id. § 717f(h).  One of 
those conditions is that the company hold a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, id., which the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issues when the project “is 
or will be required by the present or future public convenience 
and necessity,” id. § 717f(e).  In other words, the NGA 
delegates — as here — federal eminent domain power to a 
natural gas company to promote the construction of a gas 
pipeline that FERC has determined to be required by public 
convenience and necessity.   
 
B. 
 
 The Supreme Court long ago established that exercises 
of the federal eminent domain power require the application of 
federal substantive law regarding just compensation.  See 
Miller, 317 U.S. at 379–80.  The Court in Miller addressed 
issues concerning the just compensation due as a result of the 
federal government’s condemnation of property in California, 
including whether any increase in value to the land taken due 
to the Government’s proposed action is properly included in 
the measure of compensation.  Id. at 370, 375.  Under federal 
substantive law, the answer was no, but under California law, 
the answer was yes.  Id. at 376–79.   
 
The landowners urged the Court to apply state law by 
arguing that “Congress ha[d] adopted the local rule followed 
in the state where the federal court” sat.  Id. at 379.  The Court 
declined the invitation, determining that the pertinent statutes 
required only the adoption of state “forms and methods of 
procedure,” and “d[id] not, and could not, affect questions of 
substantive right—such as the measure of compensation—
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grounded upon the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at 
379–80 (emphasis added).  That is, the Supreme Court in 
Miller held that when the right to compensation is based in the 
federal Constitution, federal substantive law applies to 
determine just compensation.  Id.   
 
 We followed Miller’s lead in United States v. Certain 
Parcels of Land, 144 F.2d 626, 627 (3d Cir. 1944), where we 
considered whether a pre-taking contract for the sale of 
property condemned by the United States was admissible to 
prove the property’s market value.  The trial court applied 
Pennsylvania law, which considered the contract inadmissible, 
and excluded the document.  Id.  But we held that, according 
to federal law, the contract should have been admitted because 
it spoke to “just compensation, affecting the appellant’s 
substantive right, and its relevancy is therefore a federal 
question to be determined unfettered by any local rule.”  Id. at 
629–30.  We have reaffirmed that federal law controls how we 
measure the federal substantive right of just compensation.  
See United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F.2d 874, 
876 (3d Cir. 1946) (“This question of substantive right, 
namely, the measure of compensation, is grounded on the 
Constitution of the United States and federal law controls.”); 
Kinter v. United States, 156 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir. 1946) (“The 
matter in controversy being the right of compensation of a 
landowner under the Fifth Amendment, the answers to the 
questions involved do not depend upon local law.”); United 
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 145 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir. 
1944).2   
 
                                              
2 As the majority recognizes, a body of federal law regarding 
just compensation already exists.  Maj. Op. 21.   
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C. 
 
 Miller and our cases interpreting it are clear that when 
the substantive right to just compensation derives from the 
Constitution, such compensation is measured according to 
federal substantive law.  One’s right to just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment is certainly triggered by an 
exercise of the federal eminent domain power.  See, e.g., Kirby 
Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1984).  And 
Congress may delegate that power to private entities.  See 
Boom Co., 98 U.S. at 406.   
 
These principles lead to the following conclusion:  
because Congress has authorized natural gas companies to 
invoke the federal eminent domain power under the NGA, and 
because exercise of that power entitles a landowner to just 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the question of just 
compensation in an NGA condemnation action is a question of 
federal substantive right to which federal substantive law 
applies.   
  
The landowner (“King Arthur”) and the majority 
disagree, cabining Miller’s scope to condemnation actions by 
the federal government only and adopting the view that the law 
properly applicable to determining just compensation depends 
on who is exercising the federal power to condemn property.  
But the right to just compensation “grounded upon the 
Constitution of the United States” is a federal substantive right, 
Miller, 317 U.S. at 380, that is triggered by an exercise of the 
federal eminent domain power, not necessarily the 
Government’s exercise of that power.  And although the 
Supreme Court in Miller did not explicitly expound that its 
holding applies to a private party’s exercise of the federal 
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power, it did not explicitly limit its reach to the Government’s 
exercise, either.3  Its focus was on the condemnee’s federal 
right to compensation.  Miller, 317 U.S. at 379–80.   
 
To carve out a separate set of rules for private parties 
exercising federal eminent domain power for a federal public 
purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) would create “an artificial 
wedge between federal condemnations brought by the United 
States and federal condemnations brought by private entities 
acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.”  Tenn. 
Gas Br. 10; see also Ga. Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 
1129 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting) 
(observing that there is no “sound reason to distinguish 
between condemnation proceedings brought by the United 
States and those in which it authorizes its power to be used by 
its statutory licensee for a federal public purpose”).4  In either 
                                              
3 The majority reads Certain Parcels of Land as recognizing 
that Miller applies only to condemnation actions by the 
Government.  But our statement that Miller “set forth . . . the 
standard by which the amount of compensation due an owner 
of land condemned by the United States is to be determined” is 
merely an acknowledgement that Miller provided law for the 
same situation we addressed in that case.  Certain Parcels of 
Land, 144 F.2d at 629.   
4 The majority notes that two other Courts of Appeals have 
opined on the issue before us.  I do not consider the opinions 
from those courts to be persuasive.  In reverse chronological 
order, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Columbia 
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage 
Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1195 n.4 (6th Cir. 1992), reached its 
conclusion notwithstanding that the parties apparently agreed 
that federal common law applied and that neither party 
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action, the federal eminent domain power is exercised and 
triggers the constitutional right to compensation.  
   
My colleagues rest their acceptance of this distinction 
(and Miller’s inapplicability) on the conclusion that “the 
powerful federal interest at play when the federal government 
is the condemnor is considerably weakened when a private 
entity is the condemnor.”  Maj. Op. 17–18.  This is so, 
according to the majority, because “the development of natural 
gas pipelines is not an ‘essential governmental function[,]’” 
Maj. Op. 18 (quoting United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 
360 U.S. 328, 332 (1959)), and the “significant concern about 
the spending of federal dollars” by the Government-
                                              
addressed the issue.  In addition, the court did not even mention 
the Supreme Court’s Miller decision in its opinion.  Similarly, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi River 
Transmission Corp. v. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662, 665 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1985), also failed to mention Miller in what the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly noted was a “summary 
treatment of th[e] issue.”  Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1197.  
Indeed, the analysis was limited to two sentences in a footnote.  
The holding of the Tabor court is also problematic in that the 
court relied solely on the “practice and procedure” clause of 15 
U.S.C. § 717f(h) to reach its conclusion — an approach both 
my colleagues in the majority and I reject.  Maj. Op. 19–21.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Georgia 
Power, 617 F.2d at 1124, noted how the issue of which law to 
apply was “a close one” and relied upon (as does the majority) 
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).  
Insofar as I believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller 
controls, we need not conduct the inquiry prescribed by the 
Kimbell Foods decision.   
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condemnor is missing in eminent domain actions brought by a 
private party, Maj. Op. 18.5  But these concerns are not 
determinative, in my view.  The Supreme Court’s holding in 
Miller — at least as pertinent to this appeal — did not turn on 
either concern, but instead on the fact that the substantive right 
of just compensation was grounded on the United States 
Constitution.  Miller, 317 U.S. at 380.  In other words, federal 
law applies to determine the just compensation owed upon an 
exercise of the federal eminent domain power because the right 
to just compensation is a federal substantive right, regardless 
of whether the taking is for an “essential governmental 
function” or requires the spending of federal dollars.   
 
The majority’s final argument to distinguish Miller is 
likewise unpersuasive.  My colleagues contend that Miller 
merely sets a constitutional floor for just compensation and that 
states may, through their own laws, provide for greater 
compensation for landowners.  Assuming that that observation 
is correct, it still does not explain why Miller does not apply 
here, a federal condemnation proceeding.  That states may 
provide landowners more generous compensation (under state 
law) is immaterial.   
 
Because I view the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller 
as controlling, I would affirm the District Court’s application 
of federal substantive law to determine just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment.   
 
                                              
5 King Arthur also argues that Miller is inapplicable because 
there, unlike here, private property was taken for a public use.  
The majority does not appear to accept King Arthur’s assertion 
that its land was not taken for a public use, and neither do I. 
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II. 
 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
